

## How to cultivate sociable virtues during the Grand Tour:

### Adam Smith's educational plan for the Duke of Buccleuch and their Franco-Scottish connections

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#### 0. Why Toulouse? The role played by Hume and Colbert de Castlehill in Adam Smith's choice

In his explanation of how to come up with the idea of this conference, Alain Alcouffe states that “While writing a book devoted to Adam Smith's visit in Toulouse in 1764 and 1765 shortly to be published by Palgrave, my attention was drawn to the strange and fascinating figure of Seignelay Colbert de Castlehill, born in Inverness in 1735, educated at the Scots College of Paris from 1747 to 1762, who was Vicar General to Archbishop Loménie de Brienne, in the diocese of Toulouse, from 1764 to 1781, from whence he became Bishop of Rodez”. My encounter with Colbert de Castlehill is quite similar to this, although my acquaintance with the figure through Smith is, I'm afraid, too recent and my knowledge about him is too shallow at the moment to give a paper in front of French historians of the 18th century. At the current stage, my focus here would be on the importance of the French connections for the Scottish Enlightenment (including literati, not only common people and Jacobites) and the role played by the Scottish communities in France—with a particular focus on Colbert de Castlehill—in Smith's decision of visiting Toulouse, rather than on Colbert himself.

There is an enigma, at least for me personally, regarding why Adam Smith finally chose Toulouse for the base of his Grand Tour as a tutor of the (later called) Duke of Buccleuch. This is all the more mysterious because Smith appeared to be quite familiar with the political situation of this troublesome city at that time before their actual visit, whose central issue was, needless to say, the *Affaire Calas*. As is well-known, Smith expressed his great respect and admiration to the future author of the *Traité sur la tolérance*, already in the first edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. While a few historians emphasise the rapid transformation of Toulouse to an enlightened city so far as the high society (with which Buccleuch and his teacher would be connect

ed) is concerned,<sup>1</sup> it is probable that some sources of information about the city were given to Smith via Voltaire's practical and political activities, as well as via his Scottish connections in France (Hume and Colbert), Smith being influenced by Voltaire's view when forming an image of Toulouse in advance of his visit. And when his hero in France underlined catholic fanaticism and superstition in the city—which may be distinct from Protestant enthusiasm according to Humean vocabulary—predominant enough for vulgar common populace to ardently back the execution of the protestant merchant, it is quite unlikely that Smith did not hesitate more than once to stay there with a young protestant aristocrat. In fact, Colbert de Castlehill suggested a few reasons Smith and Buccleuch might have felt uncomfortable in Toulouse (despite several incentives including the firmly established “English” community there) in his letter to David Hume, which obviously included popular fanaticism shown relating to *Calas Affaire* (along with a following incident relevant to the former, the English ambassador's (unjust, for Colbert) attack to François-Faymond David de Beacudrigue).<sup>2</sup> It is scarcely possible, on the other hand, to imagine that Smith was passionately roused by a sense of mission nor an awareness of his duty as an actively engaged man of letters with enlightening, so as to leave for this still superstitious city, if considering his cautious or prudent character. In fact, Nick Phillipson assumed that “experience of orthodox polemical at Glasgow, Oxford and Edinburgh must have given Smith a horror of violent religious controversy and of the sort of arguments which were impervious to his or anyone else's philosophy. Indeed one wonders whether it was Voltaire's fearlessness of attacking *l'infame* in a way that was beyond him that had made Smith a lifelong admirer”.<sup>3</sup>

If so, why did Smith take his student to Toulouse, which seems to have lots of negative factors to discourage him to do so? To answer in advance shortly, the most important reason is Colbert de Castlehill. At the centre of Smith's accessible Scottish connections in France is he, with whom Smith got acquainted through David Hume.<sup>4</sup> As Phillipson suggested, Hume was almost always there when we trace Smith's intellectual journey, and it is the case with our investigation here. But what looks characteristic o

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Phillipson 2010, chap. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ian Simpson Ross 1995, *The Life of Adam Smith*, chap. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Phillipson 2010, *Adam Smith*, p. 244.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Phillipson 2010, p. 185: “Toulouse, the second city of France, was chosen as a suitable place for the intensive education Smith and Townshend had in store for the Duke for the next eighteen months. It was a choice almost certainly made with the advice of Hume, and his kinsman, the Abbé Colbert, Vicar-General of Toulouse, who undertook to introduce them to local society and probably to arrange suitable accommodation”.

f this case is that there are two intermediating figures, Henry Scott and Colbert, between Hume and Smith. It goes without saying that without Henry Scott, the third Duke of Buccleuch, Smith could not go to France as it really was. Likewise, without Colbert de Castlehill, he might not have decided Toulouse as their base in South France.

At the end of this introduction, before moving on to the next section, I would like to draw the audience's attention to the basic fact that their travel is not only for Smith himself as an Enlightenment thinker, but is a Grand Tour. This means that their visit and stay in France is a part of his educational programme, whose chief focus doubtlessly includes a moral education that should be given in order for the future Duke to cultivate a set of (practical and intellectual) virtues expected for a man of honorable (but practical) position to have. In fact, his commitment to "moral culture"<sup>5</sup> or moral education seems to be conspicuous in his entire life (which could somewhat be linked with the Hutchesonian moral project within the Scottish Enlightenment that is criticised by Hume's psycho-anatomical approach), as this interest could be detected with ease in the earlier editions of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as well as in his correspondences throughout his life. It is his lifelong concern with moral cultivation—for which to discuss a variety of virtuous deeds and character is essential—that was concretely incarnated as an educational programme during the Grand Tour in 1764–6.

## **1. Franco-Scottish connections: how important the ties with France are for the Scots**

The studies on how crucial the French connections were for the Scottish Enlightenment have outstandingly been developed recently, particularly thanks to the late Nick Phillipson, Alexander Broadie and Alain Alcouffe. Within the scholarship on the Age of the Enlightenment, Phillipson and Broadie are often mentioned as representing a relatively new current of framing the Enlightenments in plural with an emphasis on their own national contexts, critiquing the universalistic understanding of "the" Enlightenment modelled out of the religiously radical *philosophes* in France. This summarising of the recent literature is, however, a one-sided understanding to considerable extent. They are

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Thomas Ahnert, *The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment*; Thomas Ahnert, 2011. "The Moral Education of Mankind," in Ahnert and Susan Manning (eds), *Character, Self and Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

surely quite sceptical of the traditional, ahistorical, narrowly philosophical and universalised notion of Enlightenment that was insensitive/insensible to the plurality or particularity of social, historical contexts. But it does not denote that those who underline particular national contexts wherein a variety of Enlightenments emerged and developed have paid little attention to international or transnational contexts, in which various ideas, vocabularies and knowledge were exchanged, transplanted, received, refuted, reinterpreted, etc. (as well as the comparative studies of the Enlightenment). Actually, Phillipson and Broadie are among the most prominent historians of political and social thought who have extensively discussed the influence of the Continental (and particularly French) connections or pan-Europeanism/Francophilia on the Scottish Enlightenment. In regard to Adam Smith, Phillipson appears to have put more emphasis on France or the French when writing that tremendous biography on Smith published in 2010. One of the highlights of Smith's links with France is his Grand Tour, which has recently been examined by Alain Alcouffe & Philippe Massot-Bordenave with the unprecedented entirety.<sup>6</sup>

The enduring legacy of the Francophile tradition to the eighteenth-century Scottish intellectuals is, indeed, worth attention for the purpose of this paper. It is beyond debate, according to recent scholarship, that the central feature of the Scottish Enlightenment lies in the fact that its mainstream figures are Unionists, Hanoverians, anti-Jacobites, Lowlanders, and improvers of the Scottish culture and industries including agriculture. It is also true, nevertheless, that they are far from immune to identity crisis so as not to hesitate at all to identify themselves with a part of the British – 'North Britons.' In fact, even after the 'universal opulence' brought about by the Union of 1707 started to be recognised, a number of intellectual Scots still tend to feel somewhat uneasy about vulgar insularity of their ally, frequently accompanied by almost unhealed Francophobia aggravated by the second Hundred-Years' War. For Scottish *sceptical* Whigs, unlike English vulgar Whigs possessed with the ahistorical myth of ancient constitution, France in continental Europe can be situated as another model of civilized society, with a distinct form of government from quasi-republican England. Needless to say, David Hume's conception of 'civilized European monarchies' is a representative expression of their impartial view. It is, thus, the Franco-Scottish connections that give them another, alternative exemplar for improving and refining

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<sup>6</sup> Alain Alcouffe and Philippe Massot-Bordenave, *Adam Smith in Toulouse and Occitania: The Unknown Years*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

Scotland.

### 1.1 England as Israel, and as a Francophobic nation

That the Humean critique of the vulgarity and insularity of English Whiggism is not necessarily born of Scottish prejudice, or simple jealousy of English gentlemen, is proved by contemporary historians such as Linda Colley. Within her master work, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, she traces the cultural origins of English nationalism/patriotism and the national identity of the British Empire to the Francophobic sentiments and related interests in the midst of the Age of Enlightenment.<sup>7</sup> Placing emphasis on the religious dimension, Colley argues that the fundamental identity of the English as an “elect nation” favoured by God – a notion established during the Puritan and Glorious Revolutions – was inseparable from their incurable antipathy toward France, which was regarded as a leader of something amounting to an “axis of evil” under the manipulations of the pope, as an “anti-Christ”.<sup>8</sup> For the English people – who continue to celebrate Guy Fawkes Day even now – exercising intolerant Protestant values through an anti-Catholic sentiment was an indispensable part of the ideology that would integrate the nation during the second Hundred Years’ War between England and France.<sup>9</sup> Colley dedicates particular attention to the reinterpretation of cultural memories concerning the persecution of the Puritans during the counter-Reformation as a means of stirring patriotism and nationalism, which tended to associate these persecutions of the common populace with the menace and incursions from Catholic Europe.<sup>10</sup> In this respect, English nationalism appears to have originated in a preoccupation with anti-Catholic and Francophobic “paranoia”.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the fact that this Puritan exceptionalism would later be exported to the New World – and, ironically, enable the Thirteen Colonies to become independent of their metropole through the alliance with France, even under the name of “liberty” – at home in England this identification as a “chosen people” functioned as a pretence

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<sup>7</sup> See also, John Rough, *France observed in the Seventeenth Century by British Travellers*, Stockfield, 1985; idem., *France on the Eve of Revolution: British Travellers Observations 1763-1788*, 1987. 【コリ―8頁】 Cf. Linda Colley, “Britishness and Otherness: an argument”

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Katherine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain 1530-1645*, Oxford, 1979; William Haller, *The Elect Nation: The Meaning and Relevance of Foxe’s Book of Martyrs*, New York, 1963. On Hume’s description of enthusiastic Puritans of this period, see, Phillipson, *Hume*, ch. 5 & 6

<sup>9</sup> Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740-1830*, 1987.

<sup>10</sup> Colley, *Britons*, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Doohwan AHN’s studies of Lord Bolingbroke

from which to exaggerate the contrast between the blessed liberty of England and French despotism, with the French propensity for flattery and servile behaviour in the court of Louis offering a prime example of their national character.<sup>12</sup> It is precisely here that we can discern the ideological combination of parochial Protestantism and republican language – the very combination of which cosmopolitan Hume was ever wary of as a hotbed in promulgating enthusiasm or fanaticism. On the other hand, it should also be noted that this national exceptionalism was deeply linked with the democratic aspect of the English culture, emphasising the fact that even the common people of England could enjoy liberty and were able to read the Holy Scripture directly, without the trend toward superstition caused by the intercession of the (Catholic) clergy.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, this complex of aggressive Protestantism and democratic republicanism was thoroughly permeated with gendered language. The reason the French people were reduced to being slaves of the *Grands Seigneurs* is – according to this unquestionably masculine language – that they had been beguiled into forfeiting any manly *virtus*, and were now at the mercy of feminine *fortuna*. This masculinity had the potential to be just as much a threat to the English ruling class, however, who tended to entertain an international and Francophile taste for refinement, while merchants – as a newly-arisen social class – made every effort to re-construe their economic activities as something manly and virtuous – in a word, to portray themselves as patriots who were indispensable in England's survival during the war with France.<sup>14</sup> Broadly speaking, then, Englishness during the eighteenth century – ostensibly fostered by the common people and new social classes in the big cities, rather than by the traditional elite – was above all defined by anti-papal Protestantism, whose chief rivals then were the servile French and their despot.

## 1.2 Scottish identity politics in the Union of 1707: Enlightenment, religion and church politics

As we have seen, Colley unveils the potentially shocking fact that what has largely been regarded as the “polite and commercial”<sup>15</sup> – perhaps even demure – nature of the English people was actually integrated and even somewhat democratised by a jingoistic n

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<sup>12</sup> Colley, *Britons*, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> Colley, *Britons*, p. 46, 54.

<sup>14</sup> Colley, *Britons*, p. 92–3.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783*, Oxford University Press, 1989. Langford rather demonstrated that eighteenth-century England was a less orderly world of treasonable plots, rioting mobs, and Hogarthian vulgarity, along with the development of commercial politeness.

ational identity in the midst of the Age of Enlightenment. This modern reinterpretation of the eighteenth century has also served to validate much of Hume's observations concerning aspects of what amounts to the decidedly *unsociable* sociability and substantially impolite character of Addisonian politeness in England. At the same time, however, Colley's monograph also suggests that virtually the same can be said of Scotland – by which it is meant that the Scots, as a Protestant and anti-Catholic nation, had no choice but to turn against France as one of the leading powers in Catholic Europe, in allegiance with their Protestant neighbours.<sup>16</sup> If so, the thesis posited above – namely that Francophile Europeanism, or cosmopolitanism, presented a valid ideological alternative for the Scottish Enlightenment – hardly seems tenable.

While Colley's analysis of eighteenth-century English nationalism is incredibly persuasive, however, her understanding of Scottish society of the period appears to adopt a somewhat partisan stance, and is arguably biased through a retrospective and possibly teleological point of view. Although she sometimes draws the reader's attention to the Franco-Scottish connections and the Scots' amiable sentiments toward continental Europe,<sup>17</sup> Colley nevertheless assumes that Scotland in the period after the Reformation had every reason to ally with England as a protestant country against Catholic France, and that the alliance with France against England was no longer a realistic alternative for political and religious reasons. Simply extracting a politico-religious framework geared toward explaining English nationalism and re-applying it to Scottish society raises issues of potential anachronism, as it is unlikely that the Scots themselves felt that they had no alternative but to unite with England following the Glorious Revolution, even by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Contextualism requires historians to exclude any retrospective viewpoint, in order for the vividness of the political debate and discourse to be reconstituted as much as possible. In this case, as in many others, we must strive to place ourselves in the shoes of political actors who could have no foreknowledge of the efficacy of their debates nor their ultimate outcome, but merely anticipate them. From an authentic point of view such as this, it must still have appeared that there were indeed several viable options open to the Scots in regard to their political future – even in the period following the Glorious Revolution.

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<sup>16</sup> David Allan, "Protestantism, Presbyterianism and National Identity in Eighteenth-Century Scottish Historiography," in I. McBride and A. Caydon (eds), *Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland c. 1650–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 185–205.

<sup>17</sup> Colley, *Britons*, p. 28, 39.

tion, when the plan of a parliamentary Union with England was real and imminent.

When we consider the fact that the origins of the Reformation in the British Isles lay with John Knox – a man who maintained a strong antipathy toward the prospect of Mary Stuart being repatriated from the “effeminate” and “corrupted” court of France – it might appear that the Scots had even greater precedence in standing against France than the eclectic English. In reality, however, it is far more reasonable to suppose that the Union with England was merely one of many possible – even if the most probable – resolutions for the Scots during the political debates of 1706–7 and the period immediately preceding it; the possibility of retaining their political independence through alliance or union with Europe – founded on the prevailing balance of power and the concerted state of Europe, rather than on strongly integrated federation – would have been considered more-or-less equally viable, at least by some notable figures.<sup>18</sup> Three points should be further noted in this context: first, that a considerable number of Scots were not Presbyterians but Catholic, as inhabitants of the Highlands tended to be Jacobites; second, that Episcopalianism within the Anglican Church appeared, from a Presbyterian perspective, to be almost as alien and threatening as French Gallicanism, meaning that it does not necessarily follow that they would have regarded France as an unconditional common enemy and England as a self-evident ally;<sup>19</sup> and third, that the religious alignment of a people – namely whether the majority were Catholic or Protestant – did not automatically determine the political identity of a nation (as exemplified by Richelieu’s decision of intervention to the Thirty Years’ War on the *raison d’État*), but rather that national identity started to become largely defined by religious factors of this nature only *during* and ostensibly *because of* the very debate over the prospect of parliamentary Union. Taking these considerations into account, it would be an outright distortion to present Unionism between Scotland and England as a foregone conclusion for the well-informed among the Scottish citizenry. On the contrary, once we give their Francophilia and Anglophobic sentiments due credit, the possibility of vying with England on the grounds of a pan-European connection must have appear

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. Colin Kidd, *Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500–2000*, Cambridge U. P., 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Ahnert, *The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment, 1690–1805*, Yale U. P., 2014, pp. 17–19. Cf. Colin Kidd, “Religious Realignment between Restoration and Union,” J. Robertson ed., *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707*, Cambridge U. P., 1995; Alasdair Raffe, “Presbyterianism, Secularization, and Scottish Politics after the Revolution of 1688–1690,” *Historical Journal* 53, 2010; Tristram Clarke, “The Williamite Episcopals and the Glorious Revolution in Scotland,” *Records of the Scottish Church History Society* 24, 1990.

ed, to many of the Scots, to be another, equally tempting alternative – nor was this “cosmopolitan” strategy for the survival of Scotland merely limited to Jacobites. The thesis that Scottish Protestantism inevitably results in the Union with England and hostility toward France is by no means an *a priori* line of reasoning, but rather a practical and performative discourse that the Unionists actively employed – and ostensibly invented – in order to persuade those Scots who had yet to decide to regard this as the only realistic option. In short, it would be a mistake to situate this thesis as a genuine political theory or analytical tool belonging to historians as observers, when in reality it constitutes a performative act played out within the politics of culture.

A particularly important thing to appreciate here is the serious misgivings the Scots had regarding Episcopalianism within the Anglican Church. When William of Orange succeeded to the Scottish throne – having rid Britain of the Catholic King James (*Jacob*) – he originally planned to establish a state church endorsed and supported Episcopalian bishops, with little intention of accepting a Presbyterian settlement.<sup>20</sup> For the Scottish Kirk, their position as an established church seemed precarious at this time, with the supreme authority of the General Assembly continuously under the threat from the Episcopalian clergy.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the superiority of a largely Anglican parliament over the Scottish church – as determined by the parliamentary Union of 1707 – rendered the independent governance of the Presbyterian Church profoundly insecure – owing to the fact that a bench of bishops sitting in the House of Lords in London could be structurally influential to the internal affairs of the Kirk. All this came about through the Patronage Act of 1712, under which the supremacy of presbyteries and synods as democratic governing bodies were restricted through the heteronomous powers of local patrons.<sup>22</sup> As such, it was quite reasonable for the Presbyterians in Scotland to entertain doubt as to whether the Glorious Revolution had resolutely changed English monarchy from Catholic to purely Protestant, and to treat the differences between Presbyterians and Episcopalians as a matter of seriousness. Indeed, it was more plausible to suspect that England had retained its imperialist ambition of forcing Scotland to accept Episcopalianism, which was brought to light since the Bishops’ Wars by Charles I – the

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<sup>20</sup> T. Ahnert, *The Moral Culture*, p. 17.

<sup>21</sup> Clare Jackson, *Restoration Scotland, 1660–1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas* (Woodbridge : Boydell Press, 2003), pp. 109–110.

<sup>22</sup> Colin Kidd, “Conditional Britons: The Scots Covenanting Tradition and the Eighteenth-Century British State,” *English Historical Review* 117, no. 474 (2002), 1147–1176.

new British historians has started to describe these wars as a part of the three Kingdoms' Wars.<sup>23</sup> This is why it seems preferable to consider the Unionists as having made every effort to emphasise the menace presented by the French ambition of establishing a "universal monarchy",<sup>24</sup> as part of a stratagem designed to make the Presbyterians' wariness of Anglican Episcopalianism appear insignificant in comparison and unworthy of serious consideration. And while history attests that this powerful rhetoric in favour of the Union seems to have been a resounding success,<sup>25</sup> in order to maintain a true contextualist perspective, it is crucial that we pay sufficient attention to any and all counter-arguments that might have proven equally influential during the debate, as if historians did not know the result of this Union controversy.

Taking all of the above into account – at least within the context of the early eighteenth century – it would be a mistake to suppose that the need to unite with England – in the face of what was believed to be a growing threat in Europe – was a matter so beyond debate that any Francophile political notion would have been automatically rejected as absurd in Scotland. On the contrary, even by the middle of the eighteenth century – not to mention during its initial decade – several Scottish Enlightenment thinkers took Francophile pan-Europeanism seriously enough to develop their own novel cosmopolitan (but not necessarily Stoic) ideas, as has been heretofore examined. It is now obvious that to say that any Francophile or Europeanist ideologies could not be something taken seriously in post-Union Scotland is too simplistic. It is not historically justifiable to assume that the formation of the Protestant coalition in Great Britain made it impossible for Scottish intellectuals and noblemen to maintain their amicable/friendly relations with France, the Catholic nation located on the opposite side of the Channel.<sup>26</sup>

## 2. Virtue ethics in Smith's moral education

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<sup>23</sup> Pocock, *Discovery of Islands*, ch. 5.

<sup>24</sup> John Robertson, "Universal monarchy and the liberties of Europe: David Hume's critique of an English Whig doctrine", in Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner eds., *Political discourse in early modern Britain*, Cambridge U. P., 1993. Cf. Ahn Doohwan

<sup>25</sup> Cf. C. A. Whatley, *The Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 2-4.

<sup>26</sup> Another break often emphasised by those who stress the decline of Franco-Scottish connections and the integration of Britain is the Edict of Fontainebleau.

## 2.1 The language of virtue: revising the view of Adam Smith as a moral minimalist

A more or less similar inclination to Hume's sceptical attitude toward Englishness with the pan-European perspective can be found in Adam Smith as well. Indeed, the impact of French Enlightenment literature on Smith has been demonstrated by his modern biographers such as Phillipson. While the relations between Smith and Physiocrats have long drawn scholarly attention, it has turned out, according to his study, that those influential to Smith include French moralists who were dedicated to the delicate and sensible anatomy of the human mind. At the same time, however, Smith consciously distances himself from the position of his friend David Hume, who showed his (almost) enthusiastic Francophilia in their private correspondence.<sup>27</sup> As is discussed later, this slight but significant divergence between the two Scots is of great interest, as the Scotch virtue ethics, the argument of national character and the view of civilized society all cross at this point.

The language of virtue is much more important for Smith's moral philosophy than was considered before. Indeed, recent literature on Adam Smith's moral philosophy has started to discuss his so-called virtue ethics. When David Hume – whose ethical theory has first of all been situated at the beginning or origin of classical utilitarianism, chiefly posthumously – began to be re-interpreted as a virtue ethicist (cf. Slote 2001: 5ff; Driver 2006: 151ff; Hursthouse 1999: chap. 4 & 5), Smith was still contrasted with Hume as being within action-based liberalism, with a special emphasis on moral motives (which is usually distinguished sharply from utilitarianism as consequentialism). Regardless of whether Hume would be a predecessor of utilitarian liberalism, a successor of classical virtue theory, or even both, within the early-modern humanist tradition, Smith generally continues to be situated within the modern liberal lineage, sometimes framed as a proto-Kantian theorist (Fleischacker 1999; Haakonssen 1981: 1–3). There are, however, several systematic readings of Smith appearing that focus on an indispensable role virtues play in his moral system.<sup>28</sup> Such a wide variety of interpretations might seem to be confusing. But, once the assumption, quite common among ethicists and political theorists, that theories in normative ethics are basically incompatible with each other is suspended, as intellectual historians indeed do, it would rather be easy to discuss his virtue ethics without saying that he is no longer a non-consequ

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<sup>28</sup> Griswold (1999); Hanley (2006); Hanley (2009); Fizgibbons (1995); Deirdre McCloskey (2008); Broadie (2010); Hill (2017); cf. Blackburn (2015: 42ff).

entiaalist liberal, or that he is irrelevant to liberal utilitarianism at all. The recent attention to virtues in Smith is not equal to assuming that he is not a utilitarian or quasi-Kantian universalist and exclusively a virtue ethicist.

Needless to say, there are already very few who supported the nineteenth-century German social scientists' view that Smith established the self interest-based descriptive explanation of the social order—which is separated from normative theory or moral language—in *The Wealth of Nations*, through abandoning his altruistic moral philosophy expressed in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. The existence of his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* delivered before his visit to the Continent, in which the basic constitution of his political economy was already given, made it impossible to maintain that Smith got off his ethical theory constructed as a professor in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow after his encounter with Physiocrats during his stay in France. Actually, while his idea of “commercial society” systematised through *The Wealth of Nations* is far from an “ethic-free zone” (Berry 2013:130), it is also invalid to interpret *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which continued to be revised considerably after the publication of *The Wealth of Nations*, as expressing Smith's altruistic or humanistic understanding of sympathy. Despite this interpretative shift, to underline moral thinking permeated through his entire philosophical system should not be confused with saying that Smith's moral expectation of human beings was actually thick rather than thin, or that he was in reality a civic humanist who requires people to master strong civic virtues. In my view (which is exhibited in more details elsewhere), Smith, as a social scientist who descriptively elucidates human behaviour and morals, rather tends to represent civilised societies as unique collective entities that are able to maintain the order without strong morality imposed on their members. Smith emphasises that commercial societies in modern civilisation function quite well even if lacking in beneficence or benevolence. What he considers as indispensable for modern civilised societies to avoid their destruction only includes ordinary moral power of self-discipline or sense of duty, as well as commonplace understanding of the laws of justice. Smith himself admits that while people who do not harm others without valid reason would be fully approved of in terms of justice, they are seldom called to be virtuous.

Smith could thus be interpreted as a moral minimalist in one sense, whereas any interpretation of his economics as only amoral or egoistic is beside the question. To add in haste, however, this again does not necessarily mean that the language of virtue has little room for Smith's philosophy. On the contrary, one can easily find it fre

quently employed by Smith on many occasions. Assuredly, what can be dubbed a “thin theory” in terms of modern liberalism may be a central feature of his historical and theoretical explanation of the commercial stage in the civilising process. This is, nevertheless, only a part of his philosophical system, with rather thick moral arguments being extensively developed in its rest heavily indebted to the moral vocabulary of virtue ethics. And, as this paper focuses on, the importance of this often demanding moral concept (i.e. virtues) is particularly marked in Smith’s moral teaching for his students, of course, including the Duke of Buccleuch.

## 2.2 Smith’s language of virtue in the context of describing character and moral teaching

The most remarkable description, given by Smith, of human character with the language of virtue can be found in his *éloge* to the late Hume.

[...] but concerning whose [= Hume’s] character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him from exercising, upon proper occasions, acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded, not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme **gentleness** of his nature never weakened either the **firmness of his mind**, of the steadiness of his resolutions. His **constant pleasantry** was the genuine effusion of good-nature and good-humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of **malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men**. It never was the meaning of the raillery to mortify; and therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight, even those who were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not perhaps any one of **all his great and amiable qualities**, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that **gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities**, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect

the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to **the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man**, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit

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This highest appraisal of his closest friend hit the right nail on the head regarding Hume's lifelong project of demonstrating the assumption that human beings are able to almost reach the moral perfection of wisdom and virtue without Christianity (and, perhaps without any religious belief). This eulogy/tribute later turned out to be quite a serious cause for this always prudent and allegedly a little cowardly "*philosophe*" to draw many attacks from not only "zealots",<sup>30</sup> but also several moderate or conservative "Enlightenment" thinkers such as some of his friends in Johnson's Club. They included Edmund Burke, somewhat surprisingly, who was an author of one of the most prominent reviews for Smith's maiden work that appeared in the *Annual Register* for 1759.<sup>31</sup> But, apart from this interesting issue concerning the Enlightenment and religion, these sentences include no less significant point to discuss in terms of his virtue ethics as well.

As is intensively analysed elsewhere, the distinction between the amiable and respectable virtues plays a crucial role in Hume's and Smith's moral philosophy, each of which is interpreted as virtues for spectators and for actors. As is also discussed, in comparison to Hume, Smith generally tends to stress the importance of respectable virtues such as self-command, in relation particularly to a modern civilised society. Of great importance to the current argument regarding the *Letters from Adam Smith, LL.D to William Strahn, ESQ.*, is the fact that Smith points out the actual trade-off (or something like a barter trade) between cultivation of respectable and amiable virtues, while they are theoretically and ideally not incompatible with each other. The above tribute situates Hume as an ideal model or exemplar of a "perfectly wise and virtuous man", which is considered as being essential for any virtue ethics, via implying that Hume's life was a scarce demonstration of the compatibility of the respectable and amiable virtues within one character. By contrast, as will be argued later, it is unlike

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<sup>29</sup> Corr., pp. 217–21.

<sup>30</sup> This happened despite that "even this last tribute was tempered with caution and determination not to arouse the fury of the zealots" (Phillipson 2010, p. 245).

<sup>31</sup> Phillipson 2010, p. 246–8; p. 162.

ly that Smith thought of himself as an amiable nor cheerful person, even if he was proud of the highest degree of respectable virtues he reached, and also of his ability as a tutor of conducting his students to the same peak.

Another important scene in which Smith counts heavily upon the moral language of virtue is when he behaved and thought as a teacher, particularly as a private tutor. In advance of his well-known tutoring for Buccleuch in the Continent, he had a chance of applying his ethical theory to real education, which occurred to him soon after the completion of the first edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. We find that Smith made use of moral terms developed in his first book when describing his private student, Thomas Fitzmaurice. Representing Fitzmaurice's mind as "rather strong and firm and masculine than very graceful or very elegant", who had been "very lively, and tolerably ungovernable" sixteen-year-old Etonian in his arrival at Glasgow, Smith praised his student's personality, writing to Fitzmaurice's father, the first Earl of Shelburne, as follows:

No man can have a strong or a more steady resolution to act what, he thinks, the right part, and if you can once satisfy him that any thing is fit to be done you may perfectly depend upon his doing it. [...] He had learned at Eton a sort of flippant smartness which, not having been natural to him at first, has now left him almost entirely. In a few months more it will probably fall off altogether. The real bottom of his character is very grave and very serious, and by the time he is five and twenty, whatever faults he has will be the faults of the grave and serious character, with all its faults the best of Characters.<sup>32</sup>

This worthwhile "character", "disposition" or "merit" was basically natural to Fitzmaurice himself, according to Smith, but it was surely cultivated through his days in Glasgow always with his tutor, thanks partly to "Oeconomy", or private financial management, Smith imposed on his student as daily discipline. As Smith reported to Shelburne, Fitzmaurice was made to "pay all his own accounts after he had summed and examined them along with me. He gives me a receipt for whatever money he receives: in the receipt he marks the purpose for which it is to be applied and preserves the account as his voucher, marking upon the back of it the day when it was paid. These shall all

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<sup>32</sup> Corr., p. 70; cf. Phillipson 2010, pp. 168–9.

be transmitted to your Lordship when there is occasion” .<sup>33</sup> It goes without saying that this was firstly aimed to cultivate the virtues of moderation, temperance, thrift, (frugality) and industry, endorsed by a proper economic sense. But this seemingly trivial discipline actually had a wider scope for Smith’ s plan for moral instruction. As Phillipson suggested, “Fitzmaurice’ s domestic life was closely supervised and regarded as a sort of education in itself” .<sup>34</sup> This can, again when Smithian ethical theory is applied, be explained as a disciplinary process of establishing self-command/self-governance, which also is a part of internalisation of supervising spectator as a “person within” or “consciousness” .

Interestingly, Smith also mentioned Fitzmaurice’ s (minor) demerits accompanied by his very merits: “To this excellent disposition he joins a certain hardness of character, if I may call it so, which hinders him from suiting himself, so readily as is agreeable, to the different situations and companies in which he has occasion to act” . Shelbourne’ s son has an excellent moral ability of taming capricious passions to follow rules once they are given, according to Smith, whereas he was judged to be weak in flexible adjustment: “The great outlines of essential duty which are always the same, you may depend upon his never transgressing, but those little properties which are continually varying and for which no certain rule can be given he often mistakes. He has upon this account little address and cannot easily adjust himself to the different characters of those whom he desires to gain” .<sup>35</sup> This point appears to considerably correspond to what *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* discusses when critiquing the “casuistic” approach to morals. ....

### 2.3 Grand Tour and Smith’ s own moral character

Let us move on to Smith’ s education for Buccleuch during their travel to France. In spite of their Grand Tour being broadly supported by Hume, its nature is quite different from what can be dubbed a Humean ideal of moral culture or improvement. As far as the moral distinction between respectable and amiable virtues is concerned, what was then expected for English and Scottish young gentlemen to develop in the Continental Europe tends to be amiable virtues and the *art de plaire* [art of pleasing] to become properly sociable. There were, however, several sceptical opinions about whether this would

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<sup>33</sup> Corr., pp. 31–2; cf. Phillipson 2010, p. 168.

<sup>34</sup> Phillipson 2010, p. 167.

<sup>35</sup> Corr., p. 70; cf. Phillipson 2010, pp. 168–9.

btedly respectable professor at Glasgow had the right qualifications for this general purpose. In comparison, at least, to Hume as a gift from heaven in the age of sociability, Smith is hardly able to be said as being very sociable in a Francophone manner or meaning.<sup>36</sup> This would be so even though several respectable virtues surely are indispensable elements. Indeed, more than a few of his friends deplored Smith being designated as this unsuitable position for his talent. David Dalrymple commented that “Mr Charles Townshend will make a very indifferent *compagnon de voyage* out of a very able professor of ethics. Mr Smith has extensive knowledge and in particular has much of what may be termed constitutional knowledge, but he is awkward and has so bad an ear that he will never learn to express himself intelligibly in French”.<sup>37</sup> As cited by Phillipson, “even David Hume thought it worth warning his friend the Comtesse de Boufflers that ‘his sedentary recluse life may have hurt his air and appearance, as a man of the world’ ”.<sup>38</sup> Another episode worth mentioning is also introduced by Phillipson’s biography, according to which Smith’s accompaniment was useless for Buccleuch’s introduction to local society in Edinburgh to be successful. Regarding the celebration of his coming age and his recent marriage to Elizabeth, daughter of the Duke of Montagu, Alexander Carlyle wrote as follows: “The Fare was Sumptuous, but the Company was formal and Dull. Adam Smith their only Familiar at Table, was but ill qualifi’ d to promote the Jollity of a Birthday, and Their Graces were quite unexperienc’ d”.<sup>39</sup>

It is true that he would not be the best choice if Townshend had wanted Buccleuch to be a man of the world with the Francophone sophistication. Smith as a virtue ethicist tends to pay more attention to greatness of moral character than to its gentleness or amicability, and his own character is basically along the same lines as well. But his employer, Charles Townshend, was already aware of his character to some extent. Actually, Townshend considered that Smith’s earnest personality was rather suitable for his ambition; namely, he wished Buccleuch to “grow to be a grounded politician in

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<sup>36</sup> “while no one doubted his ability as a professor there were questions to be asked about his suitability as a mentor for a young nobleman who had to be groomed in the courtly skills expected of his rank. Smith’s French was poor and his manners were decidedly awkward” (Phillipson 2010, p. 184).

<sup>37</sup> Ross, pp. 195–6. (Dalrymple’s comment was made to Horace Walpole.)

<sup>38</sup> D. Hume–Comtesse de Boufflers, 15 July 1766, Hume, *Letters of David Hume*, vol. ii, p. 63.

<sup>39</sup> Carlyle, *Anecdotes and Characters*, p. 250; cf. Phillipson 2010, p. 203.

a short course of study” .<sup>40</sup> For Townshend, the statesmanship (or what is dubbed the “superior prudence” by Smith) that he required his stepson to learn may have related more to Smithian general science of laws and government including political economy, than to French polite manners.

Smith himself was quite critical, in fact, of the traditional style of the Grand Tour. Although it is not clear whether he already had the same opinion before or during the Grand Tour of 1764–6, his view expressed in *The Wealth of Nations* published in 1776 is quite harsh:

I the course of his travels, he [=a young English man] generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects, he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious application either to study or to business, than he could well have become in so short a time, had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the **inspection and controul** of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life.<sup>41</sup>

He probably had in mind how to maintain or develop his student’s self-disciplinary power during the tour already in 1764. It may even be possible to say that his main aim to take the young nobleman to Toulouse was to secure a good environment for intensive education, rather than to let the young Duke experience sociable life with sophisticated men of the world in France. Smith stuck to his teaching method of “**inspection and controul**” that had been applied to Fitzmaurice’s curriculum a few years ago.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Ross, “Educating an Eighteenth-Century Duke” , in *The Scottish Tradition: Essays in Honour of R. G. Cant*, p. 185; cf. Phillipson 2010, pp. 184–5.

<sup>41</sup> WN V. i. f. 36; cf. Ross, *The Life of Adam Smith*, chap. 13.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Phillipson 2010, p. 188.

All above being considered, it would be probable that the *plaisir* or *jouissance* of sociable life in French polite society was not necessarily their primary motive. There certainly were some contingent events that prevented them from smooth access to French socialites. Unfortunately, the notably free-thinking and ambitious Loménie de Brienne, newly appointed archbishop who “was a friend of *philosophes* such as Turgot, Morellet and d’Alembert, a habitué of the leading Paris salons and the owner of a magnificent library of books on politics, trade and public finance” was away from Toulouse. In addition, Choiseul’s recommendation that was promised by Townshend turned out to be not yet available, only the person they could count on being Colbert de Castlehill. Smith complained of this unexpected situation to Hume:

Mr Townshend assured me that the Duke de Choiseul was to recommend us to all the people of fashion here and everywhere else in France. We have heard nothing, however, of these recommendations and have had our way to make as well as we could by the help of the Abbé [Colbert] who is a **Stranger** here almost as much as we. The Progress, indeed, we have made is not very great. The Duke is acquainted with no French man whatever. I cannot cultivate the acquaintance of the few with whom I am acquainted, as I cannot bring them to our house and am not always at liberty to go to theirs. The Life which I led at Glasgow was a pleasurable, dissipated life in comparison of that which I lead here at Present. I have begun to write a book in order to pass away the time.

By and large, however, it is likely that, from the beginning, Smith had in mind an educational plan, wherein cultivating the typically French virtues of amiability was of secondary importance. In reality, they did enjoy sociable life to some extent thanks to Hume’s incredible effort to introduce key figures in high society, but almost always with serious and academic discussions at the same time.

#### **2.4 The amiable and respectable virtues and national character of France**

Then, did sociability not have any important place in Smith’s Grand Tour programme? To answer this question beforehand, mine is: no, probably not. The key concept may be the “assembly of strangers” (in which how to control your own passions and conduct is crucial all the more because your respondents in conversation would probably be your strangers and too diverse to easily anticipate their reaction).

Normally, British young gentlemen were, through Grand Tours, expected to refine their rudeness by acquiring sociable manners, as is already pointed out, so as to (ideally) make their own character or disposition pleasant and enjoyable to others. It was usually thought that visiting France suited this purpose best, as the French had a national character that was amiable, while the English (or British) were thought to characteristically have a respectable character such as self-command. Hume had the same contrasting view of the characters of these two nations, obviously preferring the French national character. Here is a point at which Smith diverged from Hume. Smith may have had a plan to cultivate a certain type of ability essential for sociability, but it seems to be a self-disciplinary one, rather than distinctively French or Humean social virtues such as gaiety, wit and benevolence (although Hume notably “emphasizes that virtue has a self-regarding aspect and should not be considered solely with a view to benevolence” ).<sup>43</sup>

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## **2.5 Another model of cultivating sociable virtues and the “assembly of strangers”**

### **3. Adam Smith, the Duke of Buccleuch and Colbert de Castlehill as “strangers” in Toulouse**

What I shall investigate in the last section is Smith’s idea about the forms of sociability required of those living among strangers. In this respect, his educational plan for his students, in particular for the later Duke of Buccleuch, is likely to be quite helpful. Prior to his stay in France in 1764–65, Smith had already emphasised that the disciplinary power of self-command was of central importance for educating or tutoring young gentlemen. Because this kind of respectability is sometimes considered as being difficult to cultivate within the too conversable (and allegedly corrupted) French culture by some Francophobic writers in England, it is all the more fascinating what kind of sociable life Smith thought was suitable for the Duke to effectively learn the virtues necessary for the (British) noble gentlemen. In particular, I would here like to focus on Smith’s view of how his fellow Scots living in the French society – including Hume and Colbert de Castlehill, to whom Phillipson’s biography paid attention to – be

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<sup>43</sup> Paul Russell, “Hume’s anatomy of virtue”, p. 99.

haved, at least partly as foreign strangers. ....

**3.1 Colbert de Castlehill, or a newcomer to Toulouse**

**3.2 Colbert de Castelhill' s Scottish origin(s) and his settlement in France**

**3.3 A several possible manners of being sociable in the “assembly of strangers” / among strangers**

#### **4. Conclusion**

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